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Abstract
Remote user authentication has been widely used in the integrated electronic patient record information system (EPRIS) to protect
the security and integrity of communication sessions between the login user and the medical server. Recently, Wen 17 presented the
user authentication and user anonymity scheme based on the quadratic residues and claimed that his scheme is secure. However,
we analyzed Wen’s scheme and identified that Wen’s scheme is vulnerable to password disclosure attack and does not provide
eﬃciency in password change phase. As a result, in this paper, we propose an enhanced scheme for the integrated EPRIS with
the aim to eliminate the weaknesses of Wen’s scheme. By comparing the performance with other related schemes, our scheme not
only resists several hard security attacks but also retains lower computational and communication costs.
c© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs.
Keywords: Authentication; Integrated EPRIS; Password; Quadratic residues; Smart card; User anonymity.
1. Introduction
The rapid development in information and communication technology makes remote medical and health care ser-
vices to patients a reality. In the integrated electronic patient record information system (EPRIS), which makes it be
possible to share the patients’ medical records among medical organizations and aims to help medical physicians and
health care workers to rapidly make correct clinical decisions2,3,4,5,7,9,17,18. The patient privacy and communication
security of EPRIS are important concerns for the patients to understand how the medical organizations control the
use of their personal information and sensitive medical records, such as name, telephone, address, health informa-
tion, diagnosis records and reports, etc. In EPRIS, the user accesses remote medical server via public channel and
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Table 1. Notations used throughout the paper
Symbol Description
Ui The user
IDi The identity of Ui
pwi The password of Ui
S The remote medical server for the EPRIS
K The secret key of S , where the bit-length of K is 1024 bits
ctri The counter maintained by Ui and S
n The number n = pq, where p and q are two large primes maintained by S
S K The common session key
⊕ The bitwise XOR operation
h(·) A collision free one-way hash function such as SHA-25616
|| The concatenation operation
some malicious attackers are considered to be powerful enough to perform various security attacks. Thus a secure
authentication scheme is essential to safeguard patient privacy and data integrity for the integrated EPRIS11,13,19.
Recently, many smart card based authentication schemes for integrated EPRIS have been proposed in the literature
7,8,17,18
. Li and Hwang8 in 2010 proposed a remote user authentication scheme by using smart cards and biometrics.
Wu et al. 18 in 2012 presented a secure password authentication scheme based on hashing, exclusive-or and exponential
operations. However, Lee et al. 7 in 2013 pointed out that Wu et al.’s scheme is suﬀering from the stolen verifier
attacks and lost smart card attacks. Lee et al. further proposed a new scheme to eliminate the drawbacks of Wu et
al.’s scheme and preserved all the merits of Wu et al.’s scheme. Unfortunately, the scheme of Lee et al. still had
oﬀ-line password guessing attacks and lost smart card attacks, which was showed by Wen17. In 2014, Wen proposed
a novel anonymous user authentication scheme based on quadratic residues1,15,20 for the integrated EPRIS and Wen’s
scheme has several advantages: (1) provision of user anonymity, (2) provision of mutual authentication, (3) provision
of session key agreement, (4) prevention of impersonation attack, (5) prevention of password guessing attack, (6)
prevention of smart card lost attack, (7) better system performance etc. In this paper, we analyze Wen’s authentication
scheme for the integrated EPRIS and show that Wen’s authentication scheme is because the authentication system
imposed a heavy burden on the medical server. Moreover, Wen’s authentication scheme does not withstand password
disclosure attacks. As a result, we present an enhanced scheme which overcomes the flaws of Wen’s scheme and
preserves its merits for the integrated EPRIS. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review
Wen’s authentication scheme and show its weaknesses in Section 3. The proposed scheme and its security analysis
are presented in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. Section 6 compares the performance of our proposed scheme
with other related schemes for the integrated EPRIS. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
2. Review of Wen’s Scheme
In this section, Wen’s user authentication scheme17 will be briefly reviewed. Moreover, we will show that Wen’s
scheme is vulnerable to password revelation attacks and ineﬃciency in changing passwords. There are four phases
in Wen’s scheme: registration, login, authentication, and password change. For ease of presentation, notations used
throughout the paper are summarized in Table 1.
2.1. Registration Phase
In this phase, the user Ui registers with the medical server S through a secure channel to be a legal user.
Step 1: Ui chooses his/her identity IDi and password pwi and sends the registration request (ID, pwi) to S .
Step 2: Upon receiving (ID, pwi) from Ui, S verifies the validity of IDi and computes v = h(K ⊕ IDi).
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Step 3: S computes s1 = h(pwi||K), s2 = h(h(pwi||s1)) and N = v ⊕ s2 and initiates a counter ctri = 0 for Ui. S then
creates a record (IDi, ctri) in its database.
Step 4: S stores h(·),N, s1, ctri into smart card and sends the smart card to Ui via a secure channel.
2.2. Login Phase
In this phase, when a legal user wants to login the EPRIS, he/she performs the following steps:
Step 1: Ui inserts his/her smart card into the device and inputs identity IDi and password pwi. The smart card
computes s2 = h(h(pwi||s1)) and generates a random number r.
Step 2: The smart card computes ctri = ctri + 1, M1 = (IDi||N||s2||r||ctri)2 mod n and sends a login request M1 to S .
2.3. Authentication Phase
Upon receiving the login request M1 from Ui, S performs the following steps:
Step 1: S reveals M1 by using the Chinese Remainder Theorem1,15,20 with p and q to obtain (IDi,N, s2, r, ctri). Then
S verifies the revealed ctri with the stored ctr′i corresponding to IDi. If ctri > ctr′i , S replaces ctr′i with new
counter ctri in its database. Otherwise, S rejects Ui’s login request.
Step 2: If Step 1 holds, S computes v = h(K ⊕ IDi), s′2 = N ⊕ v and checks if computed s′2 equals received s2. If it
holds, S now successfully authenticates Ui and computes the session key S K = h(s2||r||1) shared with Ui.
Step 3: S computes M2 = h(s2||r||0) and sends it to Ui.
Step 4: Ui computes M′2 = h(s2||r||0) and checks if computed M′2 equals received M2. If it does not hold, Ui stops the
session. Otherwise, Ui now successfully authenticates S and computes the common session key S K = h(s2||r||1)
shared with S for securing future communications.
2.4. Password Change Phase
In this phase, the user Ui sends (IDi, pwi, pwnew) to S via a secure channel. Then, S computes v = h(K ⊕ IDi),
s∗1 = h(pwnew||K), s∗2 = h(h(pwnew||s∗1)) and N∗ = v ⊕ s∗2 and sends (s∗1,N∗) to Ui through the secure channel. Finally,
the values s1 and N stored in Ui’s smart card are replaced with s∗1 and N∗, respectively.
3. Flaws of Wen’s Scheme
In this section, we show that Wen’s scheme does not satisfy the key security attribute such as eﬃciency in password
change. Moreover, Wen’s scheme is vulnerable to password disclosure attack and lack of system parameter in user’s
smart card.
3.1. Password Disclosure Attacks
In real environments, the user Ui may use same identity IDi and password pwi to access various remote medical
services for his/her convenience. If a privileged-insider of S can know Ui’s password pwi, the privileged-insider may
try to use (IDi, pwi) to impersonate Ui login into other medical servers. In registration phase of Wen’s scheme, Ui
registers to S by sending (ID, pwi). Therefore, Ui’s sensitive password pwi will be revealed by the privileged-insider.
3.2. Lack of System Parameter in User’s Smart Card
In registration phase of Wen’s scheme, we observe that the medical server S only stores h(·),N, s1 and ctri into
Ui’s smart card without storing the system parameter n. Consider that Ui’s smart card generates a login request
M1 = (IDi||N||s2||r||ctri)2 mod n and sends M1 to S during the login phase. However, in fact, Ui’s smart card cannot
compute M1 = (IDi||N||s2||r||ctri)2 mod n without having the system parameter n.
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3.3. Ineﬃciency in Password Change
In password change phase of Wen’s scheme, we observe that a legal user Ui cannot freely change his/her password
pwi to a new password pwnew by oﬀ-line manners. When Ui wants to change his/her password pwi to a new password
pwnew, Ui must perform two online steps with S during the password change phase. This flaw may cause a heavy
burden on medical server and Wen’s scheme has ineﬃcient problem during password change phase.
4. The Proposed Scheme
This section proposes an enhanced scheme to overcome the weaknesses of Wen’s scheme, which keeps the merits
of original schemes. In the enhanced scheme, the user can freely change his/her old password with new password by
a oﬀ-line manner without server assistance. Fig. 1 shows the entire phases of our enhanced scheme for EPRIS.
4.1. Registration Phase
In this phase, the user Ui registers with the medical server S through a secure channel to be a legal user.
Step 1: Ui chooses his/her identity IDi and password pwi and computes h(IDi||pwi||x), where x is a random number
generated by Ui. Then Ui sends the registration request {ID, h(IDi||pwi||x)} to S .
Step 2: Upon receiving {ID, h(IDi||pwi||x)} from Ui, S verifies the validity of IDi and computes v = h(K ⊕ IDi).
Step 3: S computes N = v ⊕ h(IDi||pwi||x) and initiates a counter ctri = 0 for Ui. S then creates a record (IDi, ctri)
in its database.
Step 4: S stores h(·),N, ctri into smart card and sends the smart card to Ui via a secure channel.
Step 5: Upon receiving the smart card from S , Ui stores x into smart card and Ui does not need to remember x after
finishing registration phase. Finally, Ui’s smart card contains h(·),N, ctri and x.
4.2. Login Phase
In this phase, when a legal user wants to login the EPRIS, he/she must perform the following steps:
Step 1: Ui inserts his/her smart card into the device and inputs identity IDi and password pwi. The smart card
computes v′ = N⊕h(IDi||pwi||x) and generates a random number r, where x is retrieved from its memory space.
Step 2: The smart card computes ctri = ctri + 1, M1 = (IDi||v′||r||ctri)2 mod n and sends a login request M1 to S .
4.3. Authentication Phase
Upon receiving the login request M1 from Ui, S performs the following steps:
Step 1: S reveals M1 by using the Chinese Remainder Theorem with p and q to obtain (IDi, v′, r, ctri). Then S verifies
the revealed ctri with the stored ctr′i corresponding to IDi. If ctri > ctr′i , S replaces ctr′i with new counter ctri
in its database. Otherwise, S rejects Ui’s login request.
Step 2: If Step 1 holds, S computes v = h(K ⊕ IDi) and checks if computed v equals received v′. If it holds, S now
successfully authenticates Ui and computes the session key S K = h(v||r||1) shared with Ui.
Step 3: S computes M2 = h(v||r||0) and sends it to Ui.
Step 4: Ui computes M′2 = h(v′||r||0) and checks if computed M′2 equals received M2. If it does not hold, Ui stops the
session. Otherwise, Ui now successfully authenticates S and computes the session key S K = h(v′||r||1) shared
with S for securing future communications.
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User Ui Medical server S
Registration Phase:
Select IDi, pwi, x
Compute h(IDi||pwi||x)
{ID, h(IDi||pwi||x)} 
Store h(·),N, ctri into smart card
Create (IDi, ctri) into its database
SMART CARDﬀ
Store x into SMART CARD
Login Phase:
Input IDi, pwi
Compute v′ = N ⊕ h(IDi||pwi||x)
Generate r
Compute ctri = ctri + 1
Compute M1 = (IDi||v′||r||ctri)2 mod n
M1

Authentication Phase:
Reveal M1
Obtain (IDi, v′, r, ctri)
Check ctri with stored ctr′i
Replace ctr′i with new ctri
Compute v = h(K ⊕ IDi)
Check v with received v′
Compute S K = h(v||r||1)
Compute M2 = h(v||r||0)
M2
ﬀ
Compute M′2 = h(v′||r||0)
Check M′2 with received M2
Compute S K = h(v′||r||1)
Password Change Phase:
Input IDi, pwi, pwnew, xnew
Compute b = h(IDi||pwi||x)
Compute b′ = h(IDi||pwnew||xnew)
Compute N∗ = N ⊕ b ⊕ b′
Replace N with N∗
Replace x with xnew
Fig. 1. The flowchart of our proposed scheme for the integrated EPRIS
26   Chun-Ta Li et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  52 ( 2015 )  21 – 28 
4.4. Password Change Phase
In this phase, the user Ui inserts the smart card into device and inputs IDi, original password pwi, new pass-
word pwnew and xnew, where xnew is a new random number generated by Ui. Then, the smart card computes b =
h(IDi||pwi||x), b′ = h(IDi||pwnew||xnew), and N∗ = N ⊕ b ⊕ b′. Finally, the values N and x stored in Ui’s smart card are
replaced with N∗ and xnew, respectively.
5. Security Analysis
In this section, we will analyze the security of the proposed scheme and show that our scheme is secure against the
following well-known attacks.
Password disclosure attacks: In real environments, a privileged-insider may find an opportunity to acquire user’s
password in registration phase and several schemes cannot resist password disclosure attacks. In the registration
phase of our scheme, the user Ui sends the registration request {ID, h(IDi||pwi||x)} to S via a secure channel,
where x is a 128-bit random number and x is unknown to S . To derive the password pwi of the user Ui from
h(IDi||pwi||x), the privileged-insider needs to guess correctly both pwi and x at the same time. We suppose the
probability of guessing pwi composed of exact m characters and x composed of exact k bits (in our enhanced
scheme, k = 128) is approximately 126m+k = 126m+128 . This probability is very negligible and the privileged-insider
has no feasible way to derive pwi of the user Ui in polynomial time. As a result, our enhanced scheme resists
the password disclosure attacks.
Stolen smart card attacks: Suppose the user Ui’s smart card is lost or stolen and the attacker can retrieve the stored
parameters {h(·),N, ctri, x} from the lost/stolen smart card by launching power analysis attacks6,14. Note that
Ui’s identity IDi is not stored in smart card and the attacker knows neither IDi nor pwi. If the attacker tries to
derive pwi in oﬀ-line manner from N and x, the attacker needs to guess both IDi, pwi, and K at the same time.
We suppose the probability of guessing IDi composed of exact l characters, pwi composed of exact m characters
and K composed of exact j bits (in our enhanced scheme, j = 1024) is approximately 126l+6m+ j = 126l+6m+1024 . This
probability is also very negligible and the attacker has no feasible way to derive IDi and pwi of the user Ui in
polynomial time.
Impersonation attacks: An impersonation attack is an attempt by the attacker to generate a legal request of the user
or generate a legal response of the medical server and two scenarios are taken into consideration. In Scenario 1:
The attacker may try to modify intercepted messages to impersonate a legal user to login to the medical server.
In Scenario 2: The attacker may try to submit faked responses to impersonate a medical server to cheat the
login user. We assume the attacker can collect all communication requests {M1 = (IDi||v′||r||ctri)2 mod n,M2 =
h(v||r||0)} from the previous session between Ui and S . Moreover, we assume that the attacker can learn the
values of {h(·),N, ctri, x} from Ui’s smart card.
• Scenario 1: In a new session, the attacker needs to modify the login request message M1 = (IDi||v′||r||ctri)2
modn in order to cheat the medical server. However, in our enhanced scheme, the attacker knows neither
IDi, pwi nor K. Hence, the attacker cannot compute the value of v′ = h(IDi||K) and forge a valid message
M′1 = (IDi||v′||r”||ctri”)2 mod n to cheat S , where r” is a random number generated by the attacker and
ctri” = ctrii + 1.
• Scenario 2: Continued to Scenario 1, in a new session, the legal user Ui will send the login request
{M1 = (IDi||v′||rnew||ctrnewi )2 mod n} to S with a new random number rnew and a new counter ctrnewi , where
ctrnewi = ctri + 1. If the attacker wants to impersonate the medical server S to cheat user Ui, he/she needs
to generate a valid response M2 = h(v′||rnew||1) by knowing the values v′ and rnew, which are concealed in
M1. Unfortunately, due to the protection of quadratic residue problem1,15,20, the attacker cannot derive v′
and rnew from M1 without knowing the secret primes p and q which only kept by the medical server S .
Therefore, the server impersonation attack of Scenario 2 can be prevented by our enhanced scheme.
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Table 2. Performance comparisons of our enhanced scheme with some authentication schemes for the integrated EPRIS
Features ↓ / Schemes→ Hao et al.’s3 Lee’s7 Jiang et al.’s5 Wen’s17 Our proposed scheme
C1 2Tc+2Ts+3Th 7Th 3Tc+1Ts+2Th 4Th+1Tm 3Th+1Tm
C2 2Tc+3Ts+2Th 6Th 3Tc+2Ts+1Th 3Th+1Tr 3Th+1Tr
C3 3 6 5 2 2
C4 2 3 2 2 2
User anonymity: User anonymity means that an attacker has no feasible way to identify the user Ui from the com-
munication sessions. In the login phase of our enhanced scheme, Ui’s real identity IDi is implicitly involved
in M1, where M1 = (IDi||v′||r||ctri)2 mod n. Thus the attacker may attempt to derive IDi from M1. However,
without knowing the secret primes p and q, the attacker cannot reveal IDi from M1 due to the protection of
quadratic residue problem1,15,20. On the other hands, the login request M1 is independent and diﬀerent in every
session since login counter ctri and random number r are randomly selected and changed in every session. As
a result, this dynamic concept provides the property of user anonymity.
User friendly: User friendly means that the user is allowed to change his/her password without server assistance.
This property not only reduces the heavy burden on medical server but also provides convenience at user side.
In our enhanced scheme, the user can freely change the original password pwi to a new password pwnew at
anytime by oﬀ-line manners and this makes enhanced scheme user friendly.
6. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our enhanced scheme with other previous authentication schemes
3,5,7,17 for the integrated EPRIS in terms of computation and communication costs. For convenience to evaluate the
computational and communication costs, we define some items as follows. Note that the time complexity of executing
one Tm is cheaper than traditional one-way hashing function and the time complexity of executing one Tr is as eﬃcient
as that of modular exponentiation.
• Th: The time of executing a one-way hash function.
• Ts: The time of executing a symmetric en/decryption operation.
• Tc: The time of executing a Chebyshev chaotic maps operation10,11,12.
• Tm: The time of executing a modular squaring operation.
• Tr: The time of executing a square root modulo n.
• C1: Computation cost of the user Ui.
• C2: Computation cost of the medical server S .
• C3: Total messages transmitted between Ui and S .
• C4: Total communication rounds during login and authentication phases.
As shown in Table 2, we demonstrate the performance comparisons among our enhanced scheme and other pre-
vious schemes in case of the login phase and authentication phase3,5,7,17. Our enhanced scheme saves one and seven
hashing operations than Wen’s scheme17 and Lee et al.’s scheme7 and our scheme achieves stronger security than
Wen’s scheme. Although our scheme requires one extra hashing operation, one modular squaring computation and
one computation of square root modulo n than Hao et al.’s scheme3. Hao et al.’s scheme requires four extra Chebyshev
chaotic maps operations and five symmetric encryption/decryption operations. Moreover, our scheme requires three
extra hashing operations, one modular squaring computation and one computation of square root modulo n than Jiang
et al.’s scheme5. Jiang et al.’s scheme also requires six extra Chebyshev chaotic maps operations and three symmetric
encryption/decryption operations. In fact, according to the items C3 and C4 of our enhanced scheme, it is obvious that
the performance of the enhanced scheme is still well suited for the integrated EPRIS.
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7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have demonstrated that Wen’s scheme is vulnerable to password disclosure attacks and their
scheme has ineﬃcient problem during password change phase. To remedy the aforementioned weaknesses, we have
presented an enhancement of Wen’s scheme, which overcome the weak features of Wen’s scheme for the integrated
EPRIS.
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